

NARRATOR (CONT'D)

Despite government pressure, surprisingly few Americans actually built fallout shelters, apparently recognizing they would offer scant protection in the event of nuclear war or that such a war might not be worth surviving.

THE REAL MISSILE GAP

Clip of McNamara with Gilpatrick. Graphic comparing U.S. and Soviet arsenals in 1961. "Gilpatrick Warns U.S. Can Destroy Atom Aggressor," NYT, 10/22/61, p.1. Still and clips of Power.

me

NARRATOR

Having won election, in part, by exploiting the fear of a missile gap, Kennedy asked McNamara's to quickly ascertain just how big the gap was. It took only three weeks to confirm that an enormous gap did exist, but it was in the U.S.

not know favor. The U.S. had 450 ICBMs.

The Soviets only 4. The U.S. had more than 3400 deliverable nuclear bombs. The U.S. had 1,300 heavy bombers to the Soviets' 155.

40.

40

Assistant Secretary Roswell Gilpatrick publicly flaunted U.S. superiority when he announced in October that the U.S. "has a nuclear retaliatory force of such lethal power that an enemy move that brought it into play would be an act of self-destruction....The total number of our nuclear delivery vehicles, tactical as well as strategic, is in the tens of thousands." SAC Commander Gen.

Tommy Power was not pleased by this revelation, having based his enormous funding requests on the contention that the U.S. faced a dire crisis. Refusing to go quietly, he began spotting Soviet missile sites everywhere, disguised as grain silos, monastery towers, and even a Crimean War Memorial. Power, a LeMay protege who had led the firebombing attack on Tokyo in WWII, opposed all efforts to constrain SAC.

192?

in affairs

me

date? ?

(MORE)

NARRATOR (CONT'D)

In December 1960, when briefed by RAND's William Kaufmann on the need to avoid targeting civilians, he exploded: "Why do you want us to restrain ourselves? Restraint! Why are you so concerned with saving their lives? The whole idea is to kill the bastards!" He added, "Look. At the end of the war, if there are two Americans and one Russian, we win!" Exasperated, Kaufmann responded, "Well, you better make sure that they're a man and a woman." Despite the fact that U.S. nuclear superiority was vast and growing, the Joint Chiefs wanted to increase the number of missiles to 3000. McNamara settled on 950 as the lowest number he could get away with under the circumstances.

(Coplan)

✓?
Gen. Roosevelt?
comes to work
on NYT AT&T

1000

Paul Brann, C-4
6000?

SOVIETS RESPOND

Clips of Soviet bomb tests. Still of Doomsday Clock.

NARRATOR

Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky interpreted Gilpatrick's statement to mean that "the imperialists are planning...a surprise nuclear attack on the USSR and the socialist countries." The Soviets responded by detonating a 30 megaton bomb--the biggest ever exploded--two days later. The next week they tested a 50 plus megaton bomb, which they could just as easily have made 100 megatons. McNamara later acknowledged that a surprise first strike was indeed one of the options under the SIOP--an option Gen. LeMay was openly advocating.

✓? me! Mel Lubell's ?

ROBERT LOWELL
Still of Lowell.

NARRATOR

War seemed terrifying close in the fall of 1961.

(MORE)

? de Groot

NARRATOR (CONT'D)

a "terror campaign" against Cuban refugees, including sinking a boatload of Cubans escaping to Florida; hijacking attempts against U.S. aircraft that would be pinned on the Cuban government; staging a Cuban government shoot down of a civilian airliner ("the passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday"); "an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack"; and "a series of well coordinated incidents...in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces." These would include blowing up ammunition inside the base, starting fires, burning aircraft on the base, lobbing mortar shells, inciting riots, and sabotaging ships. In April 1962, 40,000 Marines and sailors participated in Operation Ortsac--a mock invasion of a Caribbean island replete with the overthrow of its government. The message was clear. Ortsac was Castro spelled backwards. In January, the U.S. coerced Latin American countries to suspend Cuba's membership in the OAS. The Soviets correctly concluded that the invasion was imminent.

EGL - need for
US invasion

EARLY KENNEDY STATEMENTS ABOUT VIETNAM
Clips showing French exploitation of Vietnamese. Clips from Kennedy speech to American Friends of Vietnam 6/1/56.

NARRATOR

Intent upon standing up to the Communists after the Bay of Pigs and Vienna, Kennedy understood the difficulties the U.S. would face in Vietnam.

(MORE)

NARRATOR

The last thing the Soviets wanted in 1962 was a direct military confrontation with the United States. With little more than 20 ICBMs that could reliably reach U.S. soil and fewer than 300 nuclear warheads, they stood no chance against America's 5,000 nuclear bombs and nearly 2000 ICBMs and bombers. Fearing a U.S. first strike, the Russians gambled that placing missiles in Cuba could both deter an attack on themselves and protect Cuba against an anticipated U.S. invasion. Khrushchev also saw this as an inexpensive way to placate Kremlin hawks. Having deliberately misled Kennedy with promises that no offensive weapons would be placed in Cuba, he said he wanted to give the Americans "a little bit of their own medicine" and show them "it's been a long time since you could spank us like a little boy--now we can swat your ass." Khrushchev equated Soviet missiles in Cuba with U.S. missiles on Russia's border in Turkey and in Western Europe. Kennedy did not agree.

10? (38 hundred?)

well...

AMERICANS WEIGH RESPONSE

NSAM 196 (Oct. 22, 1962)--establishment of ExComm. Still of ExComm members in meeting. Clip of LeMay with JFK. Still of McNamara with JFK. Announcement of blockade scrolling across NY Times building in Times Square. Washington Post cover with Headline "Kennedy Orders Blockade of Cuba as Reds Build Nuclear Bases There; U.S. Will Sink Defiant Arms Ships." Clips of U.S. ships during blockade and Soviet ships moving toward them. Journal American Newspaper cover: "'Highest National Urgency;' JFK Talks to Nation Tonight." Clip of Kennedy speech 10/22/62.

NARRATOR

Kennedy hoped to stop the Russians before the missiles had been fully installed. He called together ExComm, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, to advise him on his options. The majority, led by LeMay, favored an air strike to destroy the missiles.

(MORE)

in ExComm?
no

NARRATOR (CONT'D)

LeMay advised, "The Russian bear has always been eager to stick his paw in Latin American waters. Now we've got him in a trap, let's take his leg off right up to his testicles. On second thought, let's take his testicles too."

ref?
Kefler?
ment

LeMay assured Kennedy that the Russians would not respond to an attack on the missiles in Cuba. Kennedy replied that they would have to respond--if not in Cuba then in Berlin. LeMay welcomed that possibility, believing the time was ripe to not only overthrow Castro, but to obliterate the Soviet Union. Most wanted the strike to be followed by an invasion. Those less ready to risk war preferred a blockade.

McNamara, whose position oscillated throughout the crisis, contended

that the presence of Soviet missiles did not change the strategic balance. Kennedy agreed but believed that allowing the missiles to stay would have devastating political consequences in Latin America and beyond.

Kennedy also confided to his brother Robert that, if he didn't take strong action, he would be impeached. But, in the coming days, he rejected the advice of his military leaders, of civilian hardliners Acheson and Nitze, and of former President Eisenhower, and opted for the blockade, which he referred to as a "quarantine" to downplay the fact that this too was an act of war. On October 22, he informed the American people:

KENNEDY

"The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear capability against the Western Hemisphere."

(?)

(?)

and in U.S.
impossible

?

THE CRISIS INTENSIFIES

Still of Khrushchev. Clips of U.S. missiles and Martin B-26 Maruder bombers in flight. Clips of B-52s being refueled in flight. SAC photo of soldier standing in front of

NARRATOR (CONT'D)

At the height of the crisis, a U-2 plane "accidentally" strayed over Soviet territory protected by jets armed with nuclear air-to-air missiles and, unbeknownst to the Americans, a Soviet nuclear missile battery was moved to 15 miles from the U.S. base at Guantanamo, ready to blow it to smithereens. War drew closer by the second. In a last-ditch effort, Robert Kennedy met with Ambassador Dobrynin on October 27 and told him the U.S. was about to attack unless it received an immediate Soviet commitment to remove its bases from Cuba. He promised to withdraw the Jupiter missiles from Turkey within three months but only if Soviet leaders never publicly disclosed this secret agreement. Going to bed that night, McNamara thought he might not live to see the sunrise. In that case, millions of others would have died with him.

Fortunately for everyone, Khrushchev decided that it was not worth the slaughter of hundreds of millions or more in order to save face. The next morning, the Russians announced that they would withdraw the missiles. The crisis was over. Or was it? Although the American public breathed a sigh of relief, the crisis actually continued for three more weeks. Kennedy also demanded that the Soviets remove their Il-28 bombers from Cuba on the grounds that they could potentially carry nuclear weapons and that the Russians cut military personnel on the island down to 3,000. For Khrushchev, acceding to this demand was complicated by the fact that the planes now belonged to Cuba. On November 11, Khrushchev made an offer similar to the one Robert Kennedy made to Dobrynin. He offered his "gentlemen's word" that he would remove the Il-28s at some later date. Kennedy demanded that he publicly announce their immediate withdrawal. The U.S.

(MORE)

mf?
ment
Dobbs

2d throat

infiltration

Kennedy / JFIC

4-5

RFK/me

X

for Chap 7 C-I Kyrise

404 99 - Berlin

100 - ~~Kyrie~~

405 Chap. 7

109 Hilfslate

No. of weapons

112 - WVK / Power

113 MM

114 - Molotov on Hilfslate

refugee 30MT 58MT

115 Kelley

116 Powell

118 Mayrose

119 March 1962 Northwards protest

April 62 Ottawa

for now

120 VPK on arrival

? 412 - number of low overheads 300? 124

"From US IS? (or threats over Berlin - Hilfslate)

Army

125 ~~sweat your ass~~

X - NO - DE on too many stoppage

127 VPK Turkey "major order"

413 128 Kelly

414 Kelly informed Bell? NO

129 VFR in Kelly

"esp. in LA" ?

⑬ Kelly Munich (Stevenson)

131 VFR not strict

415 "Th" (= K)

SAC flt avions 3000 mcs

133 Berlin sub?

a few F-59 sub

134 Antwerp - sub

NO "New VFR required, freq...."

O-2 "accidentally", protruded &...

136 McN

137 K in RPK

and/or see tanks? NO

138 pattern repeat? JFK turned over?

419 33 S-4 missiles? 42?

S-5's shifted

139 two nos

- expecting 10,000 SDVs (14,000) 100,000 Cubes

expected 4800 US dead 18K co.

"last" Israeli 43,000 280 cubes

McN - 25% US dead (?)

140 would have reported cuts
NO

141 McN on JCS

142 JFK on K

143 shifted?

- K cut in 1962? NO

final acceptance of two Groups with existing borders

(Berlin?!)

147

B. 422 JFK + K (Cuban)

(see also + K: Sergei)

150 Cuban AC (draft?)

151 McN as withdrawl

McN to Herkis on " 1962? or 1963?

153 JFK - Bonelli

424 M-N-T not formal or silent withdrawal

155 when to demand publicly

425

158 JPK - move

431 mix. comp in Hartleben in March 63?

from '62 7 Dynamite (Kelly)

174 3d by of Pigs

436 (and in the summer?)

K ant -

←

10 NSAM 273 change?

11 Recore out - own VN?!

SBA

14 HCl

19

25 McCarr - LBJ (for more bone?)

LC LBJ in intell

443 27 White 1M in 7 years (1972)

28 on McC and others 29 CW

Aug 22 '65 500. book needed; q ?

Chinese + 300K

X CIE and 50,000: 100K

33 Arnold Johnson, 8 stars

497 Nov 65 Maj. Charles Cooper, auto to Andrean (?)

(34)

35 China, RT

36 Return

CIA convinced? No, (B)

Aug 66 - Table PP: NO - 1967

37 McN
buy paper

450 - 40 Loyalty - on McN

New - (McN wins of New)
bring

453 46 Arnold Wilson vs. ones at the bank:

1964 "Drapers Rd" [?] meeting

54 Linda May 27 '64

55 56

59 April 11, 1968 Fin. Branches

63 Volunte new fed

774? H^s got no balls on N/Chenault

N 68 for Communists? Marxist?
74 big cities — per capita CIA

(McN us. Indonesia 65

Holland

Bogotá 64

America

Chile (World Bank, 71)

Angola

(Dear Rep) 65

Moscow/Moskva

(Peru?)

(Sikorski)

504 Adm → juntas like NO

807-08 (PP - good):

+ deal not gotten copies to 7

(going underground) ... was to get

100 ["but after the election, who are with the new... "]

571 [Dear — ^{"driving revolution"} Fidel Castro April

571 [CIA cut off funds in '73...]

(Dec 72 on Cuba — after the war...)

2,756 MT on Xmas = WWII + Korea

113 — Buttafuoco to DE?

Dear Premier undermined? N! (FBI / CIA?)

519 Sables - two news, 1975?

522 Sawit & dried mangrove

Pasih?

529 paper + Wet Bumper, "Centang"?

(Centang had nominal Scoop folder
for Pres. at '72 Dur cerv)

531 Centang abd.

540 Summary of offer
Aug - Dec

546 PD-89 no-cites, first
(any plan? :)

547 double contracts

549 Notes on future plans 1980
McHenry - as Vann monitor
describes of workers